WEBVTT 00:00.000 --> 00:09.440 Ready, and thanks for coming to this session of people are waving, and people I recognize. 00:09.440 --> 00:11.720 This is great. 00:11.720 --> 00:12.720 My name is Karen Sandler. 00:12.720 --> 00:16.120 I'm the Executive Director of the Software Freedom Conservancy. 00:16.120 --> 00:21.800 And as many of you know, I'm a lawyer in Basin, United States, admitted to the State of 00:21.800 --> 00:22.800 New York. 00:22.800 --> 00:27.640 And I've been working in the free software space for a long time, and I often get questions 00:27.640 --> 00:34.360 about US anti-trust and generally anti-trust regulations generally, but I am not an anti-trust 00:34.360 --> 00:35.360 lawyer. 00:35.360 --> 00:36.360 And I don't... 00:36.360 --> 00:40.640 If you want to talk to me about copyright or trademark or non-profits, I am here for 00:40.640 --> 00:41.640 that. 00:41.640 --> 00:42.640 A bunch of other things. 00:42.640 --> 00:48.960 And so, after thinking about what kind of material I wanted most in this room, from all 00:48.960 --> 00:52.960 of the questions that come up again and again and again, and some of the material that came 00:52.960 --> 00:55.000 up earlier in this room as well. 00:55.000 --> 01:01.320 And so, I've asked an anti-trust expert to join us for this FOSDM, and I'm so pleased 01:01.320 --> 01:09.440 to introduce a lot of rather-fird who, if we give her a call, who has worked for some 01:09.440 --> 01:13.160 of the major companies who you may have heard of, but we won't list them now. 01:13.160 --> 01:19.680 They may be some of the monopolies that are supposedly being broken by the DMI. 01:19.680 --> 01:23.080 And so, I just thought we would come and ask some questions so that we could further 01:23.120 --> 01:26.520 just educate ourselves about this issue. 01:26.520 --> 01:31.360 And I think one of the first questions I was asking around what people wanted to know is 01:31.360 --> 01:34.120 anti-trust isn't just a good thing. 01:34.120 --> 01:36.800 Why do you want to anti-trust? 01:36.800 --> 01:43.600 So, and a trust as a concept started, well, I'm going to go back to the origin and the 01:43.600 --> 01:52.040 1880s what people would do very wealthy people would do is they'd buy shares in trust, 01:52.040 --> 01:56.800 you know, as I think of like a family trust, except it was a trust across an industry. 01:56.800 --> 02:02.280 So, standard oil is probably the most famous one from back then, which was it would 02:02.280 --> 02:06.920 be several companies that were all in the same industry and you would buy shares in 02:06.920 --> 02:07.920 that company. 02:07.920 --> 02:14.800 So, what happens when there's sort of a overall trust that is running all the companies 02:14.800 --> 02:17.960 in a particular industry, they all start to look alike. 02:18.000 --> 02:23.640 They set the prices alike, they conspire on policy, they conspire on hiring all of those 02:23.640 --> 02:24.640 things. 02:24.640 --> 02:31.600 And so, in 1890, the Sherman Act was created to essentially break up these trusts and have 02:31.600 --> 02:36.640 a free and fair industry, so that's how you get anti-trust. 02:36.640 --> 02:44.800 So, I'm just going to ask the big question that's all on our minds. 02:44.800 --> 02:54.600 Now, could it be possible that proprietary software could be okay, right, right, I mean, 02:54.600 --> 02:57.920 we know proprietary software is not okay, but for when you look at it from a competitive 02:57.920 --> 03:06.560 standpoint, proprietary software is by definition exclusionary, so what gives a lot of, 03:06.560 --> 03:10.560 why aren't all the proprietary software companies being just busted up? 03:10.960 --> 03:15.320 So, I'm going to give my answer and then I'm going to say something a little bit controversial. 03:15.320 --> 03:17.520 So, I just practice it with that. 03:17.520 --> 03:23.560 One is that, and I'm just talking about protecting a market in industry. 03:23.560 --> 03:32.480 It's not about protecting an individual competitor or making all the competition alike. 03:32.480 --> 03:39.200 So, the formula for Coke can still be a secret and Coke and Pepsi can compete in the market 03:39.200 --> 03:45.400 along with a lot of other sweetened carbonated beverages, right? 03:45.400 --> 03:49.040 So, that's sort of the basic answer. 03:49.040 --> 03:56.080 Now, I was joking around with Karen this morning, and I said, one could actually look 03:56.080 --> 04:03.560 at the opposite way and say, and I don't believe this at all, that open software is somewhat 04:03.560 --> 04:09.280 of an antitrust violation, and in the sense that it's a lot of different people from 04:09.280 --> 04:13.160 a lot of different places or a lot of different companies coming together to create a single 04:13.160 --> 04:16.240 thing and product that are in put it on the market. 04:16.240 --> 04:22.400 Now, there's a lot of reasons why it's totally fair, because a, it's free, b, it's open 04:22.400 --> 04:28.560 for everyone to use in the way that they want to, but the basic of, and then this 04:28.560 --> 04:35.280 is goes back to the definition of antitrust, many, many potential competitors coming together 04:35.280 --> 04:43.160 to make a product identical in the same market that has been in itself in antitrust violation. 04:43.160 --> 04:49.760 There are riots in Boston thinking that I do not believe it's antitrust, I'm just telling 04:49.760 --> 04:54.680 you that if you look at everything a different way, you can argue it. 04:54.680 --> 04:59.080 Well, but I want to take into this a little bit more, because I think one of the things 04:59.080 --> 05:08.480 that, you know, you're aware of copyright licensing, and, you know, I guess copyright licensing 05:08.480 --> 05:13.720 in particular is a way that we always say that companies can participate on a level playing 05:13.720 --> 05:14.720 field, right? 05:14.720 --> 05:18.760 Small companies, big companies, when you have copyrighted licenses that means that everyone 05:18.760 --> 05:22.920 can contribute, and there's a fairness in it. 05:22.920 --> 05:29.440 But how does that analysis ever, how would that come to play in an antitrust analysis? 05:29.440 --> 05:34.080 And you're saying that that, that, that would that make the collusion argument even stronger, 05:34.080 --> 05:39.240 and I, I can't even believe those words are coming out of my mouth, because we know 05:39.240 --> 05:41.600 the answer is no, but go ahead a little bit. 05:41.600 --> 05:43.720 No, no, obviously the answer is no. 05:43.720 --> 05:46.480 So everybody is participating on equal playing field. 05:46.480 --> 05:48.960 It's open and free for anyone to use. 05:49.000 --> 05:59.280 So it's not, and, and I trust violation, but, and, but you could argue that if I take 05:59.280 --> 06:10.920 that free product, well, if I start charging $100 for that product, and kind of tweak 06:10.920 --> 06:15.320 it myself, and then someone else does the same thing, then, but everybody's using the 06:15.320 --> 06:19.640 common foundation, you might start to have issues. 06:19.640 --> 06:22.640 So let's go the other way, because that's a sort of a silly argument, because I don't 06:22.640 --> 06:27.360 know that anyone would really go and make that, but let's talk about those big monopolistic 06:27.360 --> 06:32.200 companies, those proprietary software companies, and let's look at the goodness that 06:32.200 --> 06:36.480 has come from the free and open software communities, developing technologies that are 06:36.480 --> 06:42.640 sometimes interoperating, sometimes disrupting, how, how much do you think that free 06:42.640 --> 06:51.160 and open software factors into this analysis, and, you know, I guess, have you, do you 06:51.160 --> 06:57.920 see that that conversation becoming more a part of the anti-trusted landscape, or is 06:57.920 --> 07:01.600 that sort of something that's coming down the road? 07:01.600 --> 07:07.600 I think it's a conversation that you all have to bring to the forefront, because it's not 07:07.600 --> 07:13.040 sort of, I think, actively being considered by, at least, regulators in the U.S. 07:13.040 --> 07:19.720 And I think to some extent, you know, you heard the DG-comp people say, come to us, make 07:19.720 --> 07:25.200 comments, and I think it's the same thing in the U.S. you have to actively participate 07:25.200 --> 07:33.400 with the regulators in order for your voice to be heard, but I just want to question 07:33.400 --> 07:40.840 one thing that Karen said, she said, these monopolies in the tech market, and I want 07:40.840 --> 07:46.080 to take issue with a definition of a monopoly, because what is a monopoly, a monopoly is sort 07:46.080 --> 07:52.760 of, well, aid dominance in the market, just because you exist in a market with six competitors, 07:52.760 --> 07:57.960 eight competitors does not make you a monopoly, even if you have, you know, billions of 07:57.960 --> 08:01.040 dollars in revenue. 08:01.040 --> 08:08.360 You have to have, well, it's European and U.S. standards differ on this, and the U.S. is 08:08.360 --> 08:09.920 trying to push it down. 08:09.920 --> 08:14.200 It always, you're a presumptive monopoly, I think, if you're over 50% of the market 08:14.200 --> 08:21.360 in the U.S. although there's been arguments in the last few years to lower that to 30% 08:21.360 --> 08:28.000 but nothing has been clearly established, but it's been proposed by the regulators 08:28.000 --> 08:34.600 in the U.S. but I think what happens is people see, oh, there's a lot of revenue for 08:34.600 --> 08:38.400 a company, therefore it must be a monopoly, which is not the case. 08:38.400 --> 08:43.920 And even if you are a monopoly, if you have over 50% of the market, you still have to establish 08:43.920 --> 08:50.840 under the anti-trust laws that you're doing something abusive to maintain that monopoly. 08:50.840 --> 09:00.080 So, it means that you're doing some action that is intentionally excluding competitors 09:00.080 --> 09:03.160 or hurting competitors to drive them out of the market. 09:03.160 --> 09:10.000 For example, you could, as some would argue that a large online retailer does, lower your 09:10.000 --> 09:16.120 prices so low that there are a blow cost and that would prevent other competitors from 09:16.120 --> 09:20.240 competing with you on an equal playing field. 09:21.000 --> 09:25.200 Putting my free software activist head-on, I mean, do you think that there's a strong 09:25.200 --> 09:29.880 argument that using proprietary software tactics to exclude people's participation and 09:29.880 --> 09:37.240 to lock down their devices is a form of monopolistic practice and is anti-competitive? 09:37.240 --> 09:43.760 I may have heard this argument before by some people in the open source community. 09:43.760 --> 09:55.440 But it is not an antitrust violation to have your own proprietary fields. 09:55.440 --> 10:01.640 I think that this argument has been made over the last 10 years by regulators in the United 10:01.640 --> 10:07.840 States that you can define a market, what they call single brand markets, what you can 10:07.840 --> 10:13.440 say, well, Google is the market or Apple is the market and they're dominant in that market. 10:13.440 --> 10:21.480 So that's sort of a lazy intellectual, as far as I'm concerned, manipulation of the antitrust 10:21.480 --> 10:27.000 laws because it's not about a single competitor or a single product, it's always about 10:27.000 --> 10:33.680 what does the industry look like and how are those competitors competing with each other? 10:33.680 --> 10:44.520 So if you're looking at phones, for example, you want to know Apple, Google, and Motorola 10:44.520 --> 10:49.320 whoever else is in the market, still competitive with each other regardless if they have 10:49.320 --> 10:52.880 their own sort of defined sphere of influence. 10:52.880 --> 10:57.440 It seems to me, especially listening to some of the sessions earlier, but the things that 10:57.440 --> 11:04.280 I've heard and watched as cases have progressed over the years in Europe and the US that 11:04.280 --> 11:09.200 Europe seems to be ahead of the United States, I think from our perspective in this community 11:09.200 --> 11:14.160 in terms of how things have progressed, are there the laws somewhat similar? 11:14.160 --> 11:17.400 Do you know, I mean, I don't know, it's a comparative law, a question is something you're 11:17.400 --> 11:24.760 comfortable with, but are they similar or is Europe, is Europe ahead of the US? 11:24.760 --> 11:30.880 So this is going to be somewhat long answers that our laws are actually written almost 11:30.880 --> 11:31.880 identically. 11:31.880 --> 11:39.320 If you look at Article 101 and Article 102 in the European Union and I trust a competition 11:39.320 --> 11:47.400 laws, they're called solve the same problem that Sherman Act Section 1 in Section 2 solve. 11:47.400 --> 11:50.400 There's not really much difference on paper. 11:50.400 --> 11:54.080 Now what's different in force men? 11:54.080 --> 11:58.960 There are a few seats in the front row of people who are standing. 11:58.960 --> 12:02.520 We're really not supposed to have people standing in here before there's four seats here, 12:02.520 --> 12:04.320 one here and two back. 12:04.320 --> 12:07.320 And then I think fills the room. 12:07.320 --> 12:12.040 Sorry, I had a lot of. 12:12.040 --> 12:14.040 It's okay. 12:14.040 --> 12:19.720 Sorry, what I was saying was that you have differences in force men. 12:19.760 --> 12:29.600 And I think you also have a difference in the evidentiary requirements in the US and well 12:29.600 --> 12:37.280 in particular in the tech industry, I'd add a third thing, which is the tech industry 12:37.280 --> 12:44.160 as a whole was, I hate to say this because the Europeans are going to be mad at me. 12:44.160 --> 12:50.600 But the became profitable in the US and grew in the US. 12:50.600 --> 13:02.080 And as it was in still nascent, regulators did not want to interfere while it was growing. 13:02.080 --> 13:06.080 And now what the question is at what point do you intervene? 13:06.080 --> 13:14.080 And one could argue that the regulators in the US were late in intervening. 13:14.080 --> 13:18.640 Why was Europe ahead of us on the intervention? 13:18.640 --> 13:24.520 Well, maybe because, and this is an argument that is made, by many people, I'm not saying 13:24.520 --> 13:26.040 it's my argument. 13:26.040 --> 13:30.000 Maybe it's because all the dominant players are American. 13:30.000 --> 13:40.280 I'm just saying controversial things. 13:40.280 --> 13:41.280 You can hate me later. 13:41.280 --> 13:42.280 I love it. 13:42.280 --> 13:44.040 I think the controversial thing works. 13:44.040 --> 13:48.320 I do have more questions to ask, but I wonder if people in the audience have specific 13:48.320 --> 13:52.600 things that they would want to ask, just because they think it's more fun. 13:52.600 --> 13:53.960 So I'm going to swap with you. 13:53.960 --> 13:54.960 You're swap with me? 13:54.960 --> 13:55.960 I'm going to swap with you. 13:55.960 --> 14:00.640 I'm going to take this and I'll run that microphone. 14:00.640 --> 14:05.440 Keep your hands up if you're going to just move back here because it's otherwise I've been 14:05.440 --> 14:09.040 giving it to the front row. 14:09.040 --> 14:13.680 So I don't know if the bundling is right legal term for that, but I wonder if practice 14:13.680 --> 14:20.640 is like being both a marketplace and a seller on that market that we see a lot in Amazon 14:20.640 --> 14:25.080 or the Play Store or a lot of other stores on the phone is something that is getting 14:25.080 --> 14:27.800 the way of antitrust regulation. 14:27.800 --> 14:33.120 And if it does, why it has not been ever acted upon. 14:33.120 --> 14:41.960 So it has been looked at and it is a, so we call it a tie and claim bundling is called 14:41.960 --> 14:43.680 a tie and claim in the U.S. 14:43.680 --> 14:45.920 And it is part of the trust relations. 14:45.920 --> 14:48.400 It has been looked at. 14:48.400 --> 14:56.320 Amazon would be quite familiar with those allegations, question of whether it's been effectively 14:56.320 --> 14:58.480 dealt with is a separate issue. 14:58.480 --> 15:06.360 I'm sure you heard me grown when you said that the difference between the United States 15:06.360 --> 15:11.680 and the United States and the opinion is sort of view to antitrust this enforcement. 15:11.680 --> 15:14.320 I like to say that rules are absolutely nothing without enforcement. 15:14.320 --> 15:18.920 You can have as many rules as you want, however if you choose not to enforce them, then 15:18.920 --> 15:21.040 they're completely pointless. 15:21.040 --> 15:27.560 My question for you is why does the United States seem not to really enforce its antitrust 15:27.560 --> 15:31.480 rules, especially when compared to the U.S. opinion, or am I incorrect in even thinking 15:31.480 --> 15:32.840 that's the premise of my question wrong? 15:32.840 --> 15:37.720 So I would make two points there. 15:37.720 --> 15:45.440 One I think is antitrust is a very blunt instrument and it's meant to protect competition. 15:45.440 --> 15:54.160 It's not meant to solve all the other political or societal problems that may arise because 15:54.160 --> 15:57.120 of tech or any other industry. 15:57.120 --> 16:03.360 And I think often, and this is happening in the U.S. now as well, as Europe is, they 16:03.360 --> 16:10.000 want to use a hammer to solve a problem that requires a screw. 16:10.000 --> 16:13.840 And I don't think it's the right instrument for everything. 16:13.840 --> 16:15.840 So that's part of the answer. 16:15.840 --> 16:17.720 And you're absolutely right enforcement is everything. 16:17.720 --> 16:24.560 I would say that historically what happens in the U.S. is how much enforcement you get 16:24.560 --> 16:28.360 has depended on the political party in charge. 16:28.360 --> 16:33.560 And if you look historically at the data, no judgments, just historical data. 16:33.560 --> 16:40.680 If it's a democratic administration, there's more enforcement than in a Republican administration. 16:40.680 --> 16:48.480 There is an interesting thing happening in the U.S. right now where HP enterprises, 16:48.480 --> 16:55.800 HP, packet enterprises, is being sued over its merger with Juniper networks. 16:55.800 --> 17:01.040 This just got filed last week or this week, no, this week. 17:01.040 --> 17:05.040 I forgot we're on Saturday. 17:05.040 --> 17:09.800 And it was interesting because if you look at the papers in the U.S. and particularly 17:09.800 --> 17:14.960 the antitrust community, it's not something that would have been expected normally from 17:14.960 --> 17:17.040 a Republican administration. 17:17.040 --> 17:21.080 And we also currently have no head of antitrust in the U.S. 17:21.080 --> 17:22.520 They haven't been appointed yet. 17:22.520 --> 17:25.640 So it wouldn't be expected for that reason now. 17:25.640 --> 17:29.600 So it may be, you know, no, yet we'll see how this plays out. 17:29.600 --> 17:35.040 This may be a Republican administration that enforces antitrust more than in the past. 17:35.040 --> 17:36.760 But it certainly wasn't expected. 17:36.760 --> 17:44.960 It certainly wasn't expected given how friendly this administration appeared towards tech. 17:45.000 --> 17:48.640 I'm curious, sort of, you may have answered this question already just now. 17:48.640 --> 17:55.560 But for those of us who aren't in the antitrust space, are there any ongoing cases that 17:55.560 --> 18:01.160 would be a particular note or particularly interesting for us to take a look at in the next 18:01.160 --> 18:02.160 year say? 18:02.160 --> 18:06.280 So I think this HPE case will be interesting. 18:06.280 --> 18:12.000 There was a case filed against Apple, you know, I would say the complaint is poorly 18:12.000 --> 18:15.680 written, but that's neither here nor there. 18:15.680 --> 18:21.720 There's the Google cases that are going on as well. 18:21.720 --> 18:24.160 Hi. 18:24.160 --> 18:26.800 So you mentioned that the enforcement? 18:26.800 --> 18:30.120 Can you just raise your hand because I don't know where you are. 18:30.120 --> 18:31.120 Yeah. 18:31.120 --> 18:35.360 So my question is, is the enforcement faster in the U.S. 18:35.360 --> 18:41.760 and compared to Europe or is the Sherman Act still relevant in the age of digital market 18:41.760 --> 18:45.440 sect and in the sense of, which is more faster. 18:45.440 --> 18:52.040 I know that the enforcement in the U.S. is traditionally in courts, like it has to go through 18:52.040 --> 18:58.080 the court process and proceedings and then it takes time and also read about it. 18:58.080 --> 19:03.520 But the question is, is Sherman Act still relevant or do you see that there should be any 19:03.560 --> 19:08.800 reforms in the Sherman Act in terms of fast tracking the process? 19:08.800 --> 19:11.560 So I'm a true believer and I trust laws. 19:11.560 --> 19:15.280 I think the Sherman Act is not only still relevant, it does not need to be modified in 19:15.280 --> 19:16.280 anyway. 19:16.280 --> 19:20.240 As I said before, one of the things is about enforcement. 19:20.240 --> 19:22.640 It's not about actual existing law. 19:22.640 --> 19:28.600 If you look at the TFE articles, it's almost on paper identical. 19:28.600 --> 19:37.240 I would say that the DMA is sort of a different beast because it's part and I trust, 19:37.240 --> 19:44.600 but it's part market regulation that has nothing to do with antitrust, tech market regulation 19:44.600 --> 19:49.640 that has nothing to do with antitrust and this is why I say, you know, not everything 19:49.640 --> 19:54.960 is an antitrust problem and you can create regulations that deal with the other aspects 19:54.960 --> 19:58.160 of what you consider harm. 19:58.200 --> 20:00.760 I don't know if the DGCOM people are still in the room. 20:00.760 --> 20:08.800 They may hate me by now, but that's my personal opinion on that. 20:08.800 --> 20:16.000 I would also say, and when I said there's evidentiary differences earlier and enforcement 20:16.000 --> 20:19.160 differences, you also have to look at our processes. 20:19.160 --> 20:28.400 I think that in Europe, the regulatory state is sort of more powerful and they're able 20:28.400 --> 20:36.480 to do things that U.S. regulators are not and also the challenging process in the U.S. 20:36.480 --> 20:37.800 is stronger. 20:37.800 --> 20:43.160 So you can actually challenge the government in court on what they say is an antitrust 20:43.160 --> 20:46.680 violation and then they have to prove it. 20:46.760 --> 20:52.960 There's no default belief that the DOJ or the FTC or whoever's prosecuting is actually 20:52.960 --> 20:54.960 correct. 20:54.960 --> 20:56.600 Hi. 20:56.600 --> 21:04.840 So I think you made it a really good point there that not everything gets solved with antitrust 21:04.840 --> 21:09.800 regulation and I think that we're really moving into that phase right now. 21:09.800 --> 21:15.200 I work a lot in the antitrust space and for the first time we are dealing with a very, 21:15.200 --> 21:22.920 very complex question of, is it monopolistic when you have buying necessity as we do 21:22.920 --> 21:29.200 with GPU production and sensitive computing, you must have the software tied directly 21:29.200 --> 21:37.080 to the hardware, which opens up non-traditional concerns. 21:37.080 --> 21:41.560 So as a lot of the regulation and a lot of the precedent that we have set in the space 21:41.560 --> 21:48.040 is software exclusive, what is it going to look like when those are a combined threat? 21:48.040 --> 21:53.640 So I'm very concerned about this issue because I think like when you start getting into 21:53.640 --> 22:00.320 some of the security questions, the question is, is it really anti-competitive conduct, 22:00.320 --> 22:09.120 which is what I'd say DOJ and FTC regulators alleged in the last couple of years and also 22:09.120 --> 22:16.040 you see here in Europe as well, but you have to make a choice as to whether security is 22:16.040 --> 22:26.200 more of a concern or the so-called competitive aspects of it or more of a concern. 22:26.200 --> 22:30.840 This is something that comes up a lot, for example, in the payment space. 22:30.840 --> 22:36.000 When you tap to pay, your entire transaction runs over a particular network and there's 22:36.000 --> 22:40.040 no intervention from a competing network. 22:40.040 --> 22:46.720 There has been a lot of complaints in Europe about sort of middlemen getting in the middle 22:46.720 --> 22:51.080 of that transaction and being able to route it into different places. 22:51.080 --> 22:57.480 And you'll see the same thing in a lot of secure messaging spaces. 22:57.480 --> 23:00.640 I should never hear. 23:01.560 --> 23:06.160 I'm not in the address space, but as a software engineer, I didn't know this is like 23:06.160 --> 23:10.320 difference in Europe and the US and that's software patterns. 23:10.320 --> 23:14.720 I think it's similar to open source like or proprietary. 23:14.720 --> 23:20.560 I think you want to have at least something to incentivize to develop that that's 23:20.560 --> 23:27.600 value and can protect them actually profit from it, so you want an incentive to develop 23:27.640 --> 23:28.600 further. 23:28.600 --> 23:35.080 However, you see also with the software patterns that a very junior patterns can be created 23:35.080 --> 23:41.880 to basically create your own protection for things that should not be protected. 23:41.880 --> 23:43.880 What do you think or it answers for that? 23:43.880 --> 23:48.640 Or do you see a flexible nose and enter a trust as well? 23:48.640 --> 23:56.880 So maybe rephrase the question for me because is the question really about, you know, 23:56.920 --> 24:02.560 what is it that you can actually have as proprietary versus interoperable or is it something 24:02.560 --> 24:03.560 else? 24:03.560 --> 24:07.360 That was more about the software patterns. 24:07.360 --> 24:08.360 The software patterns? 24:08.360 --> 24:09.600 We get rid of software patterns. 24:09.600 --> 24:15.000 Well, then how do you encourage people to create new products? 24:15.000 --> 24:21.520 I like, that's always been my question is how do you encourage people to create because 24:21.520 --> 24:25.440 they need to make some profit off of their creation? 24:25.440 --> 24:36.400 I know that there's a lot of people who have given everything for free to the community 24:36.400 --> 24:41.320 and I know that there are companies who have contributed for free, but at some point people 24:41.320 --> 24:43.320 have to make a living. 24:43.320 --> 24:47.040 I don't know what the answer to that question is because that's a big existential question. 24:47.040 --> 24:54.880 We are sadly almost out of time, but I will take the last minute to say that this 24:54.880 --> 24:58.640 is a big discussion that's been in this community and for this reason I want to really 24:58.640 --> 25:02.720 thank a lot of for coming here because really jumping into this space where we all have 25:02.720 --> 25:09.440 these really advanced ideas and advocacy for what we think is the right thing to do in 25:09.440 --> 25:14.880 our software freedom community and to come in and talk about educating us about these 25:14.880 --> 25:18.640 regulations that most of us in the community have not thought as deeply about as we have 25:18.640 --> 25:20.320 in the software patterns space. 25:20.320 --> 25:23.440 So everybody please thank a lot of our other fruits so much for joining us and thank 25:23.440 --> 25:30.440 you all for your question.